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Abstract 
 
Civil conflict has far-reaching effects on underdeveloped economies. Whilst military 
expenditure may be diverted into projects that encourage human capital accumulation 
and the construction of essential infrastructure, conflict destroys institutions and 
infrastructure generating financial instability and exacerbating stagnation and 
underdevelopment. Vicious circles emerge as socioeconomic instability contributes to 
ongoing civil unrest and financial instability, in turn increasing the risk of future 
conflicts. In this paper, the relationships between conflict, finance and poverty are 
analysed by exploring the hypothesis that poverty and conflict are magnified by 
financial factors. Interactions between conflict, absolute poverty and finance are 
estimated using least squares and binary dependent variable techniques adapted to 
capture simultaneity, with heterogeneity captured using fixed effects techniques. The 
results suggest a strongly significant positive relationship between poverty and 
conflict; the risk of war is positively associated with financial factors suggesting that 
financial resources will influence poverty indirectly by increasing risks of conflict. 
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POVERTY, ARMED CONFLICT AND FINANCIAL INSTABILITY 
1 INTRODUCTION 
In assessing the impacts of military institutions and armed conflict on economic and 
financial development, a range of questions must be considered. Do military institutions 
and/or conflict cause poverty and/or does the poverty cause conflict by creating incentives to 
sustain a strong military presence? Addison, Le Billon and Murshed (2001) and Wallensteen 
and Sollenberg (2000) observe that almost all the conflicts in the least developed nations 
during the 1990s were civil wars suggesting that domestic socio-political issues are crucial. 
The poorest countries confront problems of armed conflict most closely and so the military as 
an institution does play a key role in the poorest countries. It is important to distinguish 
between the impacts of military institutions during peacetime and during wartime. Any well-
organised and powerful public institution can have positive impacts in countries with 
otherwise underdeveloped institutions, at least in peacetime, but the real issue is not the scale 
and power of military institutions but the activities with which they are engaged.  
The impacts of military institutions engaged in peaceful activities versus those 
involved in armed conflict will differ according to the level of development of a country and 
according to social and institutional factors. Military institutions may also be crucial catalysts 
in building essential infrastructure and developing human skills; the military can play a role 
in education, building roads/hospitals and other forms of infrastructure – with broadly based 
socio-economic benefits. In addition, during peacetime, the military may promote economic 
growth and development by boosting government expenditure and aggregate demand (Benoit 
1972, 1978).  However, the extent of the beneficial effects will be dependent on the degree of 
security threat and military expenditures will have positive output effects when threats are 
high but negative output effects when threats are low (Dunne, Smith and Willenbockel 2005).  
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However, these positive impacts of military activities will be overwhelmed by the 
negative impacts of military institutions‟ actions when engaged in armed conflict because 
conflict destroys scarce but essential institutions within poor countries, including financial 
institutions. War may temporarily diminish the usefulness of natural resources and 
accumulated improvements generating a loss of income absorbing current savings and 
depleting consumption, shifting the relative values of capital goods, money and consumable 
goods in equilibrium (Keynes, 1914, p.484).
2
   
During civil wars, the ratio of military expenditure to GDP rises sharply and 
maintaining high levels of military expenditure may crowd out social expenditure 
exacerbating stagnation and continuing underdevelopment. Knight, Loayza and Villaneuva 
(1996) and Collier and Hoeffler (2006) assert that, even during peacetime, military 
expenditure may reduce growth. Collier (1995) observes that „conflicts weaken or 
incapacitate institutions that govern and provide services to facilitate transactions at a low 
cost for sustained economic development of a civil society, and encourage opportunistic 
behaviour‟.  Also, many of the human costs of war are indirect costs, not just the costs 
associated with physical violence –immediate human costs and long-term development costs 
reflect the loss of entitlements, particularly amongst vulnerable groups (Stewart and 
Fitzgerald, 2000, pp. 6-7). Conflict also generates distributional changes intensifying 
horizontal inequality across different ethnic/ religious / tribal groups as well as vertical 
inequality down through different income groups. (Stewart and Fitzgerald, 2000, pp. 6-7) 
This paper analyses some of these issues by developing a theoretical and empirical 
analysis of the military institution‟s role during armed conflicts. It explores the complex 
interactions between armed conflict, poverty / underdevelopment and financial instability by 
testing the hypotheses that financial instability exacerbates poverty, increasing a country‟s 
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 See Keynes (1940) and Fitzgerald (1997) for further detail on Keynes‟s analyses of the economic implications 
of war.  
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vulnerability to conflict with continuing underdevelopment and stagnation feeding back into 
an increased probabilities of conflicts in the future. These hypotheses are developed with a 
theoretical framework and then tested using a combination of econometric techniques.  
The paper continues as follows: in Section 2 the relationships between war and 
finance are explored and in Section 3 these are set in the context of poorer countries via an 
analysis of the feedback effects between conflict, financial factors and underdevelopment. In 
Section 4, a model is developed which uses the reaction functions of incumbent governments 
and insurgent groups to identify the interactions between conflict, poverty and finance. This 
model is estimated using a combination of techniques designed to control for heterogeneity 
and simultaneity in the context of limited dependent variable estimations. The conclusions 
and policy implications are presented in Section 5. 
 
2 WAR AND FINANCE 
In any country, developed or developing, war will have some crucial impacts on the 
macro economy. Keynes argues that war affects the macroeconomy in two ways: by affecting 
the state of finance and by affecting the state of consumption. The collapse of financial 
markets destroys paper value generating the appearance of a widespread loss in accumulated 
capital. There is a shift towards consumption during war-time and this reflects the urgency of 
needs for present goods to reduce distress and poverty in the present and near future, eroding 
the value of capital goods. “Not even the Prussian army can eat rails and embankments or 
clothe itself in bricks and mortar” (Keynes, 1914, p.486). But this does not mean that “we are 
ruined for life” though wars do lead to changes in the distribution of wealth. Essentially war 
raises the discount rate reflecting shifts in people‟s inter-temporal preferences (ibid, p. 486). 
War may necessitate the sale of real assets to finance a war effort because government 
liabilities become difficult if not impossible to sell and so liquidity preferences will be 
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shifting and unstable (Collier and Gunning, 1995). The pessimism and uncertainty that 
emerge in times of conflict will also contribute to financial instability. These forces will 
complicate monetary policy; it is difficult to target money supply when money demand is 
erratic (Collier and Gunning, 1995).  War also has negative impacts on business confidence 
and pessimism and uncertainty will be magnified within a highly liquid financial sector. 
Collier & Gunning (1995) explore the interactions between conflict and propensities to hold 
money in describing the process by which investors save profits in liquid form during wars, 
switching them to fixed investment projects in peace-time. Historically, some wars have been 
periods of financial innovation (Kindleberger, 1993). The need to finance wars may introduce 
institutional change as states increase control over banking to generate funds for war efforts. 
There may be compulsory purchases of government debt and nationalization of financial 
institutions, creating periods of financial innovation, e.g. in Angola and Croatia (Addison et 
al., 2001). But financial innovations have also made it easier to work around the fact that 
domestic infrastructure may be weak; globalisation has encouraged war financing even in the 
poorest countries and this operates on an international scale, making it harder to track 
financial flows.  
Armed conflict does not always contribute to financial instability. Magnusson and 
Wydick (2001) discuss efficiency of markets in 8 largest African stock markets in 
comparison with emerging stock markets in South East Asia and Latin America; their results 
suggest that emerging African markets are no less efficient than other emerging markets. 
However, one of the key problems emerging from repeated conflict in developing countries is 
the financing constraint. The availability of external and internal finance determines length 
and outcome of wars and conflicts (Addison, Le Billon and Murshed, 2001).  Addison et al 
(2001) argue that, in funding wars, external capital inflows in the form of legitimate diasporas 
(e.g. payroll tax on Kosofvar Albanians working in Germany, also Tamil Tigers and in 
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Eritrea) are crucial but moving money internationally requires knowledge and, sometimes 
illegal, technical assistance (e.g. from organised crime). Systems can be designed to 
circumvent exchange controls on international transfers – e.g. Hawala systems in South Asia 
(Addison et al, 2001, p. 3). 
Natural resources will play a crucial role when internal sources of war finance are 
limited. In terms of commercial borrowing, it is often based on mortgaging of future returns 
from resource wealth, tapping into influential international private interests. For example, 
Angolan war funding was on the basis of oil reserves and diamonds, which led to 95% of 
Angola‟s oil share being used in debt servicing of loans to finance arms and mercenaries. 
Similar patterns were observed in Somalia and Zaire. This sort of expenditure deflects 
finances away from social uses, promoting dualism and narrow development rather than 
broad based development. The development of national and sub-national currencies is crucial 
because currencies provide a means of raising revenue via seigniorage (e.g. in Eritrea). These 
devices may be used at unofficial level as well with rebel groups running financial systems 
and informal currencies in occupied areas, sometimes instigated under duress. (Addison et al. 
2001, Collier 2008). 
Collier and Hoeffler (2006) analyse some of the interactions between conflict and 
finance in a game theoretic context, arguing that dynamic inconsistency problems affect the 
interactions between military spending and repeated conflict / fragile peacetimes.
3
 They argue 
that military expenditure can be used as a signal by governments or a screen by insurgents to 
indicate a commitment to peace agreements - with a low level of post-conflict spending 
signalling intentions to honour peace agreements and a high level of post-conflict spending 
signalling intentions to renege on peace agreements. Governments have incentives to renege 
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 This type of game will not necessarily take place in a world of rational agents. Collier and Hoeffler (2006) cite 
Hirschleifer (2001), who notes the problem of different and imperfect perceptions of military success with a 
tendency for over-optimism in perception of military prospects. 
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on peace agreements because the military capability and therefore bargaining power of rebel 
groups decays during peacetime; this means that their threat diminishes over time and the 
resultant incentives to renege by the incumbent government can contribute to the fragility of 
peace settlements (Collier and Hoeffler, 2006, p. 6).  
There are however incentives not to renege, for example the fear of losing access to 
foreign aid. So a separating equilibrium emerges. On one hand, peace-loving governments 
honour peace agreements, signalling their intention to do so by lowering military expenditure, 
reducing the probability of further conflict. On the other hand, governments that want to 
pursue a reneging strategy will maintain military spending at a high level in the immediate 
post-conflict stage and. because this signals a government‟s intention to renege, this will 
increase the probability of further conflict (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004, pp. 7-8).  The 
selection of strategies is is determined by the relative benefits and costs of reversion to 
conflict (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004, pp. 8-10). High levels of military spending are 
associated with increased risk of renewed conflict.  
 
3 POVERTY, CONFLICT AND FINANCIAL INSTABILITY 
How does the relationship between conflict and finance affect poverty and 
underdevelopment?  Conflict generates financial strains particularly if it is associated with an 
increase in military expenditure and arms imports. In theories of greed and grievance, poverty 
and discrimination emerge in dual economies as elites seek to protect their interests and 
quash protest using violent techniques. Elites often control financial systems and state 
banking will therefore evolve to finance private accumulation, particularly in agrarian 
economies, exacerbating economic inequality and discrimination.  
Problems of regulatory capture are common in conflict ridden countries; the 
democratic institutions needed to protect impartial financial regulation do not exist. So, with 
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the exception of Korea, state control of financial systems in conflict prone countries has been 
poor (Addison et al, 2001). Controls on financial systems, such as ceilings on interest rates 
(for example, in Angola and Mozambique) operate to favour certain groups. Powerful 
politicians often own the private banks - for example in Liberia, Charles Taylor owned the 
Bong Bank. Bank credit may be directed towards enterprises run by political elites generating 
an increased risk of bad loans. Private banks may also be associated with criminal activities, 
e.g. in Cambodia only 12 of 33 private banks were legitimate; all others were involved in 
criminal activities.  
The financial system is used by elites to leverage existing wealth – e.g. coffee 
economies of Central America – fostering recurrent insurrections reflecting this nexus 
between oppression and financial control by elites (Addison et al, 2001). Furthermore, 
military spending for personal gain is often financed by sale of public assets (Collier and 
Gunning, 1995).   Rent seeking activities may exist, for example the Bank of Cambodia 
encouraged the development of many banks in order to gather the fees and fines associated 
with the licensing of a bank (Addison et al, 2001). 
Weak financial regulation in underdeveloped economics promotes wealth 
accumulation via fraud, destroying savings and living standards and sparking conflict; for 
example, during the 1997 collapse of Albanian pyramid schemes; the central bank was unable 
to act given the political connections of pyramid bankers; as deposits slowed the banks were 
unable to meet their commitments and the resultant banking collapse sent the country into a 
downward spiral of poverty and conflict (Jarvis, 1999). Also - in Indonesia, the 1997 
financial crisis emerged in the context of widespread crony capitalism as elite groups sought 
to protect their own political interests in the face of financial instability, sparking widespread 
violence against ethnic Chinese, exacerbating regional conflicts (Addison et al., 2001). 
Financial instability is exacerbated by corruption and cronyism because if financial systems 
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evolve in an unsustainable way then banking crises have the potential to generate massive 
shocks. Resolving financial shocks in conflict prone countries can involve large fiscal costs, 
taking money away from reconstruction and destabilising already fragile societies and 
economies. Thus the financing of military expenditure has negative socio-economic impacts 
in conflict-prone economies. 
The use of violent techniques to protect vested interests requires military spending, 
particularly on arms imports and this will have implications for foreign exchange reserves. 
Military expenditure may also „crowd out‟ social expenditures that could be used to promote 
broadly based development. If arms are imported then less foreign exchange is available to 
fund the imports needed for investment and infrastructure projects. The import of arms to 
enable the protection of the interests of particular elite groups may create external financing 
pressures with implications for financial stability and the exchange rate.   
Nagarajan (1998) argues that conflict affects the financial sectors of developing 
countries at many levels: at the macroeconomic level by disrupting general economic 
confidence, at the „meso‟ level by destroying key financial institutions and at the 
microeconomic level by disrupting the social relationships essential to financial transactions 
in developing economies. Armed conflict will destabilise the evolution of fragile and 
rudimentary financial structures, contributing to significant financial instability in developing 
countries. 
Addison et al (2001) also argue that, in terms of the financing of conflict, military 
expenditures are usually high, not only because of demobilisation costs but also as a deterrent 
to further rebel activity. On the other hand, government revenues tend to be low during 
conflict. The large fiscal deficits that emerge coincide with low levels of spending on social 
and economic infrastructure; following the conflict in Mozambique, fiscal deficits were 
between 10-20% of GDP. Given these fiscal deficits, the market for public debt becomes 
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crucial but capital markets in post-conflict underdeveloped countries tend to be thin because 
of financial repression. For this reason, effective financial reform is critical to the effective 
resurrecting of domestic capital markets in post conflict stages.  
These complex interactions between civil conflict and financial factors suggest that a 
number of feedback effects will operate to ensure that financial instability in conflict prone 
underdeveloped countries creates further problems of poverty and underdevelopment.  If 
financial problems are severe enough to necessitate IMF involvement, then the financial 
stringency associated with IMF conditionality may exacerbate dualism within 
underdeveloped countries: the poorest groups will suffer the most from fiscal and monetary 
tightening – particularly if elites are making military rather than social expenditure their first 
priority. Thus poverty and underdevelopment are the outcome of the vicious cycle between 
social and political unrest, armed conflict and financial instability. 
Political institutions will also play a key role. The proportion of military expenditure 
to GDP teds to be lower in democracies (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). Also, Addison et al. 
(2001) argue that financial reforms are more likely to be effective in democratised systems 
and Garfinkel (2001) argues that the political competition that characterises democracies 
introduces a negative bias into nations‟ military spending patterns and, given a strategic 
approach to military policy, this reduces other nations‟ incentives to arm as well. Thus 
Garfinkel argues that democratic institutions are a pre-commitment mechanism reducing the 
severity of conflicts and releasing resources for consumption. 
Together, corruption, financial instability and ineffective financial regulation fuel 
narrow development. Addison et al (2001) conclude that armed conflict, including its 
financing, exacerbates these economic, political and social problems. There are key links 
between conflict, finance and narrow development - contributing to dualism and extreme 
inequality, particularly horizontal inequality. Whilst narrow development is not the only 
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cause of conflict and conflict is not the only cause of narrow development, financial 
instability creates social problems and these are a catalyst to further conflict. On the other 
hand, growth reduces risk of conflict by raising levels of income (Collier 2008, Collier and 
Hoeffler 2006, 2004, 2002). Financial instability may be exacerbated by globalisation 
because globalisation eases the transfer of money and technological innovations have 
overcome some of the problems with otherwise deficient infrastructure in poor countries. 
Financial deregulation and globalisation have enabled the financing of armed conflict 
because the removal of capital controls and the reduction in the financial information 
required about borrowers has enabled easier and quicker transfer of money to fund armed 
conflict (Fitzgerald, 2003, p. 3).
4
 Conflict creates financial instability creates conflict. 
These forces all contribute to vicious cycles between conflict, poverty and finance. As 
illustrated in Fig. 1, financial instability leads to poverty, poverty leads to war and war leads 
to poverty, war leads to financial instability. The poor are excluded from decisions affecting 
these feedbacks loops because they do not control the financial system. As their control over 
the situation is limited, their only recourse is conflict.  
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 Also see Fitzgerald (2003) for a discussion of global financial information about conflict funding and the 
problems and solutions associated with and international regulation of conflict funding, particularly in the 
context of the funding of self-determination movements. 
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Fig. 1: Vicious Circles of Poverty, Conflict and Financial Instability 
 
4 A MODEL OF CONFLICT, POVERTY AND FINANCE  
A model of strategic interactions between government and insurgents can be used to 
capture the essence of the feedback effects between civil conflict, poverty and finance as 
outlined in the previous section. Assume that the government is concerned about social 
welfare but in the context of a dualistic economy, the utility of elite groups and vested 
interests is prioritised over the utility of poorer groups; the government is not a benign 
Rawlsian government. Assuming that there are n agents in the vested interest group each with 
utility ui assigned the weight av, and m poor agents in the excluded group whose utility uk is 
weighted ap, then the social welfare function will take the following modified Benthamite 
form: 
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The government will maximise this subject to the financing constraints and this will 
be determined by the availability of finance in the economy as a whole. Assuming a fixed 
exchange rate and underdeveloped financial institutions the main source of finance will be 
from foreign exchange. It is important to note that, in some economies, a major source of 
foreign exchange will come from natural resource sales. Different groups within an economy 
will have differing abilities to tap into foreign exchange from this source. The supply of 
foreign exchange will have to be divided between private demands and public demands, with 
public demands for foreign exchange comprising demands on foreign exchange to build 
public infrastructure for peacetime and demands of foreign exchange to fund military 
activities, in particular the import of arms. Thus the total supply of financial resources is 
divided as follows: 
1PMST ffff    (2) 
where fS is the proportion of foreign exchange going to public non-military projects, fM is the 
proportion going to fund military endeavours e.g. arms imports and fP is the proportion going 
to the private sector. With less public sector money available to fund projects that will 
improve human capital accumulation (viz. health and education spending) the potential for 
development will be eroded. Assuming that fP is constant, absolute poverty will be increasing 
when fS < fS*, and fM > fM*, where fS* and fM* are threshold rates of use of foreign exchange 
for social and military purposes.  
Assuming that civil conflicts emerge from a dispute between an incumbent 
government and an insurgent group(s) and so the interests of insurgents are not captured in 
the government‟s social welfare function5, the insurgent group will maximise a utility 
                                                 
5
 Note that this implies that the elements in the government‟s social welfare function will be changing as 
citizens join insurgent groups; assuming that the new recruits to insurgent groups will be the poorest, excluded 
members of the society the utility of the poorer citizens will have less and less value in the government‟s social 
welfare function. 
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function in which differing weights assigned to the utility of each member of the insurgent 
group: 
G
g
ggG uaU
1
    (3) 
In maximising this objective function, insurgent groups face two major constraints: 
availability of finance and a labour constraint – the latter being determined by the number of 
people prepared to join their group.  
The labour constraint faced by insurgent groups reflects scarcity of labour available 
for recruitment to insurgent groups; given cheap labour supplies in impoverished countries 
this will reflect the quantity of available labour rather than the real wage and the supply of 
new recruits will increase as poverty increases because fewer alternative employment 
opportunities will be available as absolute poverty and underdevelopment increase. Recruits 
to insurgent groups will be seeking economic and financial rewards e.g. from the sale of 
diamonds, oil, drugs etc. (Collier 2008). As the profits from rebel action increase the supply 
of new recruits (L) available to the insurgent group will increase. Insurgent groups will 
provoke armed conflict when they have a sufficient number of recruits i.e. when L>L* with 
the threshold labour level L* determined by p (the state of poverty) and fr (the potential 
financial rewards from rebel action e.g. from natural resource sales). If poverty exceeds a 
threshold level and if financial rewards exceed a threshold level, i.e. if p>p* and fr > fr
*
, then 
L>L* and the insurgent group will have the critical mass need to provoke a conflict.   
The interactions between the behaviours of an incumbent government and an 
insurgent group determine the states of war and poverty with probability of war and extent of 
poverty determined at the point of intersection between the reaction functions of the 
incumbent government and insurgent group. At this point the probability of war can be 
expressed as a non-linear function: 
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*][|1Pr( wwW
   (4) 
where *][|1 wwW  is an indicator function taking the value 1 if w>w* and 0 otherwise, 
and w is a latent variable reflecting the composite influences of financial resources and 
absolute poverty. Assuming that shares of financial resources as outlined in equation (2) are 
constant: 
titi
s
titi pfw ,,2,10,  (5) 
 
 Absolute poverty (p) is determined as follows:  
 
),,( * jss zffWFp   (6) 
where zj is a vector of exogenous variables affecting absolute poverty, including factors such 
as geographical features, degree of economic diversification, income growth, size of the 
economy, infrastructure and institutional variables. Armed conflict will affect poverty in two 
ways: first by diverting resources, including foreign exchange, away from social expenditure 
on health and education projects (both of which would foster the accumulation of human 
capital) and secondly, by destroying essential infrastructure and institutions. 
Previous empirical studies have explored some of these relationships between risk of 
war and socio-economic variables, identifying a positive relationship between military 
expenditure and the risk of civil war. Collier and Hoeffler (1998) find that initial income and 
population size, ethno-linguistic fractionalisation and natural resource wealth are significant 
determinants of the severity and duration of civil wars. In later studies, using data for 55 civil 
wars from 1960-99, they estimate the risk of reversion to conflict and find that growth, 
political/social/ethnic factors, primary resource abundance, external threat, years of peace, 
population and geographic dispersion and military expenditure affect the probability of 
 16 
conflict Collier and Hoeffler (2004, 2006). Collier (2008) argues that the risk of civil conflict 
is affected by levels and growth in income as well as by resource spoils. Civil conflict, 
particularly in very underdeveloped economies with large illiterate population, is not 
necessarily about political activism in the face of legitimate grievances about social and 
economic inequities. It is particularly common in underdeveloped countries because growth 
is stagnant, levels of income are low and natural resources such as diamonds, oil and drug 
crops provide one of the few economic opportunities available to impoverished groups. Civil 
conflict is therefore as much about poverty and stagnant growth as it is about rebellious 
political action (Collier 2008).  
Whilst previous analyses identify a role for many socioeconomic factors they neglect 
the impact of financial factors. An innovation in this paper is the explicit introduction of 
financial variables into the models and these previous empirical studies are developed by 
introducing foreign exchange flows as a proxy for resource flows, estimating equations (4) to 
(6) using the data sources for W, f and p outlined in Table 1. 
TABLE 1: Data Sources 
Code Variable Definition Source 
W War = 1 if country has experienced 
armed conflict, =0 otherwise 
Uppsala Conflict Database 
http://www.pcr.uu.se/gpdatabase/ 
P Poverty Poverty gap ratio (based on $1 a 
day)
6
 
UN Data 
http:data.un.org 
F Financial 
resources 
Foreign exchange reserves 
(logged) 
UN Data 
http:data.un.org 
 
                                                 
6
 The poverty gap ratio is calculated using the Sen-Shorrocks index - constructed as the weighted sum of the 
poverty gaps across a population (Sen 1976, Shorrocks 1995). 
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For the econometric methodology used, the probability of war is estimated using the EViews 
6.0 for binary estimation using maximum likelihood estimation (quadratic hill climbing 
method). This is combined with panel fixed effects estimation techniques to control for 
heterogeneity across the sample of countries. In recognition of the fact that least squares 
procedures, e.g. two stage least squares (2SLS), may not be appropriate to limited dependent 
variable estimation the simultaneity in the binary dependent variable estimation of the war 
variable is captured adopting a control function approach by incorporating all exogenous 
variables that might either directly or indirectly (i.e. via poverty) affect susceptibility to war 
(Greene 2008, pp. 813-7, Blundell and Powell 2004). Space limitations preclude a regional 
analysis to capture heterogeneity at a more disaggregated level and it is important to note that 
national patterns may obscure many inter-regional differences. In India for example, the 
conflicts involving Pakistan and Kashmir will have had different impacts on the different 
Indian states depending on their proximity to the conflicts. 
The model was estimated using data from less developed 65 countries over the period 
1991 to 2006 and the results from the estimations are outlined in Tables 2 and 3. The results 
in Table 2 show that there is a strong positive association significant at 5% [p=0.044] 
between poverty and the risk of conflict; in addition, the risk of conflict is also positively 
associated with inflows of foreign exchange [p=0041]. Identifying the direction of causality 
in this association is problematic and it could be that war necessitates foreign exchange flows 
and/or that flows of foreign exchange from resource flows exacerbate economic tensions 
increasing the likelihood of war. The lagged dependent variable is positive and strongly 
significant [p=0.000] suggesting that conflict in one period is associated with increased risk 
of conflict in subsequent periods and this is in line with the predictions of Collier (2008) et al. 
that conflict is a trap from which the poorest countries will have difficulty extricating 
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themselves. The fixed effect parameters are jointly insignificant suggesting that differences 
across countries are not strongly significant in this sample. 
 
TABLE 2: Conflict Estimations: Probit with panel (Maximum Likelihood estimation) 
Dependent Variable: W (=1 if conflict, =0 if not) 
  n=1040  (65 countries, 1991-2006) 
   
 
Parameter Standard z statistic 
 
p  
 
Estimate error 
 
Value 
Intercept -3.848 0.860 -4.473 0.000 
W(-1) 3.167 0.151 21.034 0.000 
p 0.014 0.007 2.017 0.044 
f 0.078 0.038 2.042 0.041 
Fixed effects 0.002 0.004 0.438 0.661 
     Mean dependent variable 0.223 
 
S.D. dependent variable 0.416 
LR statistic 712.004 [p=0.000] McFadden R-squared 0.689 
Log likelihood (LL) -160.879 
 
Akaike info criterion 0.340 
Restricted LL -516.881   Schwarz criterion 0.365 
 
In capturing the influences on poverty, the results in Table 3 suggest that persistence is a 
feature of poverty with the lagged dependent variable having a strongly positive and 
significant association [0.000] on current poverty. Poverty is also strongly and positively 
associated with the war dummy variable [p=0.011]. Financial resources have a negative 
impact on poverty but the association is statistically insignificant [p=0.570] perhaps capturing 
an indirect link with financial resources as these increase susceptibility to conflict. Again the 
country fixed effects parameters are jointly insignificant [p=0.000]. 
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These results are capturing some preliminary evidence on the associations between poverty, 
conflict and finance but more work needs to be done in capturing the simultaneous 
relationships and in differentiating both the positive and the negative effects of financial 
factors. In addition, recognising that financial factors contribute to instability and/or 
economic conflicts over resource rents, work is continuing in collecting data that specifically 
separates financial flows from natural resources sales, foreign aid and foreign direct 
investment.  
 
5.  CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
In this paper, the relationships between armed conflict, finance and inequality have 
been analysed and indicate that conflict, financial instability and poverty may feed into each 
other, reinforcing destabilising political, socio-economic and financial forces in 
underdeveloped countries. Whilst military institutions may bestow some benefits on 
developing economies, if their actions foster financial instability then this will have 
substantial ramifications for the macroeconomies of stagnant nations because feedback 
processes will retard/reverse the evolution of financial institutions creating prolonged 
constraints on the availability of finance in developing economies. Designing effective 
TABLE 3: Poverty Estimations: Fixed effects panel estimation
Dependent Variable: p (=poverty gap ratio)
n=1040  (65 countries, 1991-2006)
Parameter Standard z statistic p value
Estimate error 
Intercept 0.200 0.302 0.662 0.508
p(-1) 0.995 0.003 339.226 0.000
W 0.166 0.065 2.558 0.011
f -0.008 0.014 -0.568 0.570
Fixed effects -0.001 0.001 -1.017 0.309
R-squared 0.993 Mean dependent variable8.271
Adjusted R-squared 0.993 S.D. dependent variable 9.906
F test of explanatory power 34336.677 Akaike info criterion 2.473
[p=0.000] Schwarz criterion 2.498
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financial policies to overcome conflict-finance-poverty traps may be problematic, for 
example possibilities for currency reform are limited partly because currencies are perceived 
as nationalistic symbols and partly because they are desirable as a source of seigniorage 
revenue.  
In reducing the negative consequences of military interventions, particularly when 
these are precipitated by the actions of corrupt elites, the evolution of new financial 
institutions within a democratic structure is important. Effective financial reform will be 
affected by political factors and governance: the regressive effects of conflict and corruption 
may be ameliorated in the presence of democratic institutions. But regardless of political 
systems, a crucial element in breaking the vicious cycles between poverty, conflict and 
financial instability lies in the effective regulation and supervision of financial systems, 
particularly in countries that have experienced repeated conflict. Even when conflicts are 
finally resolved, during post-conflict phases there will be pressing needs to rebuild domestic 
capital markets for reconstruction and if this financial reconstruction is constrained by 
institutional weaknesses and weak regulation then financial fragility will increase 
susceptibility to future conflicts.  
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